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Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo, by Ivo H. Daalder, Michael E. O'Hanlon
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After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.
- Sales Rank: #1446683 in Books
- Brand: Brand: Brookings Institution Press
- Published on: 2001-10-01
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 8.98" h x .94" w x 6.32" l, 1.07 pounds
- Binding: Paperback
- 362 pages
- Used Book in Good Condition
Amazon.com Review
Winning Ugly is the first serious book to assess NATO's first war--an 11-week bombing campaign waged against Serbia to force its troops out of Kosovo in the spring of 1999. The authors, Ivo H. Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, both of the Brookings Institution, are careful scholars, and they are generally supportive of what the United States and its allies did: "The outcome achieved in Kosovo, while hardly without its problems, represented a major improvement over what had prevailed in the region up to that point and certainly over what would have happened had NATO chosen not to intervene." Yet they are also critical of how this particular approach was formulated by policymakers, and they readily believe better results might have been achieved. In other words, the air war was a success, but a relative one; the good guys won, but--as the title implies--they won ugly.
Daalder and O'Hanlon sometimes equivocate--"Could war in Kosovo have been prevented? The answer, we believe, is maybe"--yet Winning Ugly is an excellent summary of what happened and why it happened the way it did. On the question of whether Operation Allied Force actually prevailed, something skeptics have questioned, they write: "The vast majority of Kosovars are far better off today.... [Slobodan] Milosevic unquestionably lost the war, and his defeat was overwhelming." This is a foreign-policy wonk's book, a sober analysis that tries to draw clear lessons from experience. It's not only the first book worth examining for readers interested in what happened in Kosovo; it may be the best available for some time. --John J. Miller
Review
"As instant books go, this one is rather good. Daalder and O'Hanlon, both fellows at the Brookings Institution, speak less from the heart than from the head. To its credit, the book is heavily footnoted and conventional, in the nonpejorative sense of the t" —Eliot Cohen, Foreign Affairs, 9/1/2000
"This is a serious and worthwhile study which analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of American leadership and the NATO system in its first offensive war.... Daalder and O'Hanlon make clear that we have a lot to learn if we are going to engage in campai" —Newt Gingrich, newt.org, 9/3/2000
"A thorough, lucid, hard-hitting examination of Western, and especially American, policy, scrupulously examining the real alternatives available at the time. On the internal dispute sof Washington policymaker [Daalder and O'Hanlon] are fascinating." —Timothy Garton Ash, New York Review of Books, 9/3/2000
"Must Read" —Lex Ticonderoga, Today's Books / Public News Service, 12/5/2000
"Winning Ugly, a new book published by the Brookings Institution, a Washington policy organization, provides substantial evidence suggesting that U.S. leaders were terribly negligent when planning last year's air war against Serbia." —James Ron, Baltimore Sun, 1/9/2001
"thoughtful conclusions" — St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1/9/2001
"Daalder and O'Hanlon are eminently qualified to produce the first comprehensive analysis of the Kosovo crises." —JP Dunn, Converse College, Choice, 1/11/2001
"This volume will prove to be one of the most comprehensive and thorough critiques of how and why NATO's decisions were made in Operation Allied Force." —Timothy Shaw, Contemporary Security Policy, 3/20/2001
"As befits two Brookings Institution members... the authors are adept at pointing out the contradictions between military realities and politicians' rationalizations." —Tom Donnelly & Gary Schmitt, Weekly Standard, 4/24/2001
"It is by far the most comprehensive analysis of the Kosovo war so far." —Fiona Simpson, University of St. Andrews, International Affairs, 4/24/2001
"Mr. Daalder knows the Balkans well and Mr. O'Hanlon fully understands warfare. They make an outstanding team." —Alan Gropman, Washington Times, 7/19/2001
"Daalder and O'Hanlon chronicle in convincing and painful detail how NATO for more than a year tried hard to head off a military confrontation." —Christopher Civic, Survival
"Brookings Institution scholars Ivo H. Daalder (Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy) and Michael O'Hanlon (Technological Change and the Future of Warfare) analyze the [Kosovo] conflict in Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo. Their" — Publishers Weekly
"Some officials, including Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, have contended that the allies' qualms hampered the air war, delayed victory and endangered allied pilots. But in Winning Ugly, a book about the war released Thursday, foreign policy scholars" —Doyle McManus, Los Angeles Times
"An outstanding contribution to the study of U.S. foreign policy making." —Ryan Hendrickson, Eastern Illinois University, National Security Studies Quarterly
"A substantial Kosovo war literature has sprouted during the year since NATO's victory over Serbia, and Winning Ugly by Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon is probably the most impressive contribution to date. It manages to achieve a fair and balanced treat" —Janus Bugajski, Washington Times
"... it is an excellent first generation study. The detailed chronology and documents in the appendixes are exceptionally valuable." —J.P. Dunn, Converse College, Choice, vol. 38, no. 7, 3/1/2001
"It will be difficult to produce a better book devoted to the anatomy of Western decisionmaking- the authors have interviewed an impressively wide range of US and NATO officials, and their analysis succeeds in bringing the reader inside the confusing and approximate world of strategic choice." —Dr. R. Craig Nation, U.S. Army War College, Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, 7/1/2001
"This book enhances our understanding of what may become the future of NATO as well as some part of the future of war." —Tom Fedyszyn, Naval War College, Naval War College Review, 1/1/2002
"Their account is heartening and sobering at the same time. It is heartening because the authors offer a number of fascinating and intellectually rigorous anlayses into the possible alternatives to NATO's approach." —Jamie Shea, Director of NATO's Office of Information and Press, NATO Review, 7/1/2001
"... excellent work.... an impressive array of documents supplemented by extensive interviews." —Tom Mockaitis, Depaul University, Chicago, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 4/1/2002
"... one of the first comprehensive accounts of the Kosovo conflict of 1999. The book's greatest strength is its excellent analysis of the political and diplomatic background to the crisis.... Should be required reading for anyone involved with events in the Balkans or interested in the area." —Milan Vego, Naval War College, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 11/1/2000
"An engrossing story of how we went to war, with important lessons for how we should wage peace." —Anthony Lake,, Assistant to President Bill Clinton for National Security Affairs, 1993-97, 7/19/2001
"Winning Ugly sets the standard against which American and European actions in the Kosovo war will be measured. The authors provide an authoritative and convincing account of the policy conflicts within the U.S. government, the gap between our political a" —Warren Zimmermann, U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia 1989-1992, 7/19/2001
"Winning Ugly proves a much needed lesson on the efficacy of early, forceful U.S. intervention in the Balkans. Equally importantly, it demonstrates that prevarication can be deadly, and that half-measures yield half-results." —Senator Bob Dole, 7/19/2001
"An incisive and revealing dissection of an ambiguous triumph... providing new information on a complex decision and a difficult conflict." —Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to President Jimmy Carter for National Security Affairs, 1977-81, 7/19/2001
"Whether you ultimately accept their conclusions or not, Daalder and O'Hanlon have produced a thought-provoking analysis that represents an important contribution to the debate over when and how to use force in pursuit of foreign policy objectives." —Senator John McCain, 7/19/2001
About the Author
Ivo H. Daalder is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies and the Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in International Security at the Brookings Institution. He is the coauthor, with James M. Lindsay, of America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Brookings, 2003). Michael E. O'Hanlon is the director of research and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, where he holds the Sydney Stein Jr. Chair. His books include The Science of War (Princeton University Press, 2009) and numerous Brookings books.
Most helpful customer reviews
16 of 21 people found the following review helpful.
Important but Incomplete
By Robert David STEELE Vivas
Newt Gingrich is right when he praises this book, and the international reviewers that give it 1-3 stars are also right when they point out that it is seriously incomplete and arguing from a very American point of view.
In my view, this book is essential reading together with the following four books, all of which I have favorably reviewed here at Amazon: first, Kristan Wheaton, The Warning Solution: Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information Overload, Cees Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia: 1992-1995 (Perspectives on Intelligence History), Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, and Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime These four books cover what this book does not: 1) a full explanation of why "inconvenient warning" fails time and again; 2) a full explanation of the complete inadequacy of Western intelligence in relation to historical, cultural, and current indigenous intelligence as well as small arms interdiction in lower-tier unstable regions; 3) a useful itemization of the weaknesses of both NATO and the US military in responding to unconventional challenges in tough terrain distant from the center of Europe; and 4) how "supreme command" is most often exercised without regard to intelligence.
Having said that, let me enumerate what I regard as the very positive features of this book, one that makes it central to the discussion of NATO, Air Power, and US politics as they affect "engagement."
First, the authors are to be commended for graciously but no less effectively nailing the Clinton Administration, and especially Sandy Berger, Madeline Albright, and William Cohen, for inattention and indecisiveness and a complete lack of any coherent sustainable strategy.
Second, although the author's do not stress this point beyond highlighting it in the opening sentence of the book, it comes across as a continuing theme: the entire conflict could have been resolved early on had the NATO allies had a capability to deal with *one man*, that is, Milosevic.
Third, the authors note clearly (on page 10) how there were many non-violent precursors to the violence and ensued, and that the Albanians finally concluded that only violence would get them international attention. This is a major theme within Jonathan Schell's utterly brilliant and comprehensive book, "The Unconquerable World" and one that any future Director of Central Intelligence must be held accountable for: warning in the *non-violent* stage.
Fourth, the author's, who between them have considerable expertise in defense analysis, indict the Clinton Administration for over-selling the peace negotiation efforts of Ambassador Holbrook, and the very bad campaign planning of General Clark.
Fifth, the author's document the pattern of Madame Secretary Albright, whose own book I recently reviewed along these lines, of rhetoric rather than reality--or words rather than actions with consequences. NATO bluffed while Madeline talked. Milosevic, no fool, understood all this. Albright is, however, credited with understanding that ultimately force would be needed to achieve the policy objectives.
Sixth, and this is something I learned the hard way in El Salvador, the author's very correctly make the point that such conflicts cannot be controlled with pressure on only one of the belligerents. *Both* parties to the conflict must be challenged and contained.
Seventh, the author's are helpful in pointing out that the Administration erred in failing to consider partition and independence as an option for the conflicted parties, and they emphasize that one must never under-estimate the will of any one party to achieve independence.
Eighth, and on the head of the Republicans we place this one, the authors point out that the impeachment proceedings against Bill Clinton because of his personal relations with Monica Lewinsky severely distracted and handicapped the Administration. Indeed, I recall that in all our Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) reports at the time, we had to modify all of our search strategies to include "and not Monica", so over-whelming was the trash that would come up on Bosnia and other places we were looking at, all "hits" corrupted unless we excluded the Monica factor from US foreign policy. The lesson we take from this is that impeachment, especially frivolous impeachment, has major national security consequences, and is not merely a matter for domestic consumption or impact assessment.
The book is flawed, but not grievously, for failing to have any serious treatment of intelligence. There are just four over-lapping references to CIA, and to intelligence reports, in the entire book. In as much as this book is up to the norm for beltway policy books, we conclude that until such books have the deeper coverage and understanding of intelligence shortfalls as a matter of routine, intelligence and policy in Washington DC will continue to co-exist without reform and with a deliberate choice being made by policy experts to ignore intelligence and what intelligence, properly done, can bring to the process of peacemaking.
The author's final policy recommendation merit listing, and their elaboration is a highlight of the book:
1) Interventions should occur as early as possible
2) Coercive diplomacy requires a credible threat of force
3) When force is used, military means must relate to political ends
4) Airpower alone usually cannot stop the killing in civil wars
5) The Powell Doctrine for the use of force remains valid
6) Humanitarian interventions need realistic goals
7) Exit strategies are desirable but not always essential
8) Other countries need better, more deployable militaries
9) UN authorization for intervention is highly desirable, even if it is not required
10) Russia's support is valuable in these types of operations
11) NATO works well in peace and in war but only if US leads
12) An effective foreign policy requires that the president lead with confidence.
13) The US is not a hyperpower, but rather a superpower prone to *underachievement* instead of imperial ambition (this was pre-Bush and pre-neocon)
This book stands as the core reference on NATO and Kosovo, and as one of the more helpful references on principles of intervention and foreign policy that all future presidents and their staff can learn from.
Other more recent books I recommend, with reviews:
The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)
Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy
Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025
Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik
War Is a Racket: The Anti-War Classic by America's Most Decorated General, Two Other Anti=Interventionist Tracts, and Photographs from the Horror of It
0 of 4 people found the following review helpful.
Typically abstruse "instant history"
By His&Hers
This book's ultimate value for future historians, I predict, will be as a guide to source documents. Its analyses are already dated and rendered anachronistic by "facts" on the ground.
Illustrative of most everything that is wrong with fact-thick, morally vacant analysis, the forest of footnotes and obsession with the minutiae of diplomacy remind one of those thick studies of the Congress of Vienna (which settled Europe for a half-century after Napoleon's defeat & exile) from the 19th century. The pro-Clinton bias is also evident despite a superficial attempt as "balance." Much analytic acrobatics is performed to portray the Clinton administation and the ineffectiveness of NATO (and the cowardice of French and German leaders is almost entirely overlooked).
The authors also miss one of the central points proved so recently: war by committee, in Beltway speak, "multilaterialism", will always fail, especially when it is coupled with an Administration which plans its actions on the basis of polls and an obsession with a tainted legacy.
Nor is William Jefferson Clinton properly criticized for enganging in an adulterous affair and then committing perjury and half dozen other felonies in an attempt to hide his illicit affair. Instead some reviewers bring to task those who held Clinton accountable for his multiple crimes involving the Lewinsky affair (a Federal judge did hold him in contempt and publically label him a perjurer).
Other reviewers laughably attempt to blame Clinton and his Administration's base incompetence upon what they partisanlly call a "frivolous impeachment" (Richard Nixon faced impeachment over the VERY SAME CRIMES! Perjury, subornation of perjury, conspiracy...yet apparently when a Liberal-left Democrat commits these crimes, in the minds of some, they aren't crimes at all; after all, the Watergate burglary was, according to one of its primary perpetrators, carried out to find proof of John Dean's wife's past as a call girl; oh well, since it involved sex, it can't be a big deal).
To blame the Republican House for doing its Constitutional duty (while congratulating the Senate on failing to do its duty) and impeaching a President who brazenly committed crimes involving the abuse of his official position is breathtaking in its supercillious desperation.
This book also demonstrates why history should not be written until a significant amount of time has passed (at least ten, more profitably at least twenty or twenty-five years): lack of perspective. In the haze and smoke of recently concluded battle, any analysis is bound to be deeply flawed--as this one is.
Time must be allowed to past, scholar must be given time to digest the facts and the primary sources. Above all, time must intervene so that the actions of the immediate past (just a few years ago) can be judged in light of the lasting consequences (and results or failure) on the ground.
Even today, while it is obviously that earlier, forceful intevention, instead of the usual futzing around with the UN and NATO, bodies designed to delay action not facilitate it, no one can seriously say what the ultimate outcome of NATO's intervention or the horrors of the Milosevic/Mladic push for a Greater Serbia empire in the Balkans will be. The claims about a push for a Greater Albania are little more than Serbophilic nonsense given the economically prostrate state of Albania (as close to a "failed" state as one can get without actually being one) and the non-existence of an Albanian military. The Macedonian Army, for example, was well on its way to crushing the Albanian terrorists when the Clinton-Albright intervention halted the police action against what were an ill-equipped, poorly led band of rag-tag terrorists. (And the idea that FYROM should have to given into Albanian demands of autonomy and lingusitic equality are quite ridiculous when juxtaposed with France's long-time refusal to grant similar rights to the Bretons, Basques and other minorities; likewise with the Spanish gov'ts similar policy toward the Catalans and their own Basques; sauce for the goose is NOT apparently sauce for the gander, a point the book completely ignores).
Just as the notorious Bomb Damage Assessment of the strategic bombing of Germany during World War 2, conducted in the immediate aftermath by the US military, led to seriously flawed conclusions that distorted military policy makers appreciation for the very significant role such bombing played in destroying Nazi Germany's ability to fight, this book too will most likely be shown to contain short-comings not yet recognized.
The "instant-book" phenomenon is not, like so much else, a product of the 24-hour, internet-wired world, but one that goes back to at least World War 2 when a slew of books came out in 1940 and 1941 by, especially, journalists purporting to provide an "inside view" of Hitler's Germany. Few of these books have much value at today because their immediacy to the events they examine and the author's consequent lack of access to critical information (especially information concealed by totalitarian and or criminal regimes)render them useless.
This book should be read, if for no other reason, as a clarion call to scholars and historians to avoid the "instant" analysis bug. Time matures and improves human beings. The same is true of historiography.
The impulse to influence future historians--as well as reap quick profits from the topical immediacy of the subject matter seems as irresistable now as it was seven decades ago.
The phenomenon still continues today during the Liberation of Iraq and the democracy aborning. The vast majority of books like this will be consigned to the "dustbin of history". If they have any staying power is usually negative: cementing one political factions version of events that helps only to muddy the waters for later, more detached and impartial analyses in the decades to come. I.e. converting one political factions biases into received wisdom which only hampers serious history.
A book of straight reportage would have been far more helpful than a thick tome cluttered with stiff, wonky prose and politically influenced goals (however superficially impartial the authors attempt to be).
31 of 43 people found the following review helpful.
The American View
By Peter Gulutzan
There are 724 footnotes in this book, of which 720 seem to be for English-language sources, mostly American. And the trust in American sources is complete. For example: there's a section on the Racak massacre, with no mention that some French and German papers have cast doubts on the evidence, only a 200-word quote from American observer William Walker. For example: the famous appendix to the Rambouillet accord (granting NATO troops the right to bivouac and billet and make use of any facility anywhere in Yugoslavia) was just boilerplate that would have been deleted on request -- and the backup for this revelation is interviews with an American general and an American envoy. Why didn't they ask Yugoslavs too?
Serb criminals and crimes get full coverage along with epithets like "murderous" or "cowardly" or "atavistic". But nothing on killings of Serbs before the war, and nothing in the text about the Belgrade TV station slaughter, or the cluster bombs that hit the Nis marketplace (though that's in one of the appendixes). As for the Chinese embassy attack, it was obviously inadvertent because there was no sensible reason for it. Thus irrationality connected to Serbs proves they're murderers, while irrationality connected to Americans proves they're innocent.
I found no errors in fact, and I don't expect some balanced presentation of non-American views. But a book that doesn't even note the other views, and excises facts which don't fit with the presentation of the American view, has no value except to those who want to believe that NATO was right. Others will prefer Judah's "Kosovo: War and Revenge" (which at least checked multiple sources), and Parenti's "To Kill a Nation". Or at the extreme there's Noam Chomsky's "The New Military Humanism" which is filled with anti-NATO bias ... about enough to balance the pro-NATO bias in "Winning Ugly".
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